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The extent to which ethnic differentials persist across generations is a central question in
social science. The fact that ethnicity matters--and that it seems to matter for a very long time--is
evident not only in the United States, but also throughout the many countries where long-dormant
ethnic differences and conflicts are being reemphasized and rekindled.
Although economists have not traditionally been interested in questions relating to ethnic
convergence, the issue has been a dominant topic in sociology. Beginning with the "melting-pot"
hypothesis, which was a cornerstone of the original Chicago School of sociology, through the
revisionist view of Glazer and Moynihan's (1963) classic Beyond the Melting Pot, two opposing
models have been used to interpret the ethnic experience. The first argues that the melting pot
indeed dissolves the differences among groups in one or two generations (Park. 1950; Gordon,
1964), while the second stresses the cultural, social, and economic differences that persist among
ethnic groups. As Glazer and Moynihan (1963: xcvii) conclude: "The American ethos is nowhere
better perceived than in the disinclination of the third and fourth generation of newcomers to
blend into a standard, uniform national type."
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The dcbale over which of the two hypotheses better explains Ihe data continues in the sociology
literature. For instance. Atha (1990) stresses the cànvergence that occurred among groups of European
origin. ichile Fancy (1990) and Liebcrson and Waters (1988) note the ethnic skill differences
documenled in the 1980 Census, even among groups of European origin. See also Jiobu (1990). Sollors
(1986). Penlmann (198S). and Steinberg (1989).2
This paper investigates if the ethnic skill differentials introduced into the U.S.labormarket
by the inflow of very dissimilar immigrant groups during the Great Migration of 1880-1910
disappeared during the past century. By using the 1910, 1940, and 1980 Public Use Samples of
the U.S. Census, as well as data from the General Social Surveys (GSS), the paper provides an
empirical analysis of the long-run rate of convergence of ethnic skill differentials. The empirical
work uses the 1910 Census to document the skill differentials existing among the original
immigrant groups. The 1940 and 1980 Censuses and the GSS are then used to document the skill
differences among the ethnic groups composed of the children and grandchildren of the
immigrants. Finally, the analysis compares the economic mobility experienced by American-born
blacks to that of the white ethnic groups that made up the Great Migration.
The Great Migration
The migration of persons to the United States that occurred at the end of the 19th Century
and at the beginning of the 20th was historically unprecedented.2 Table I documents the seismic
shift that the Great Migration had not only on the size of the immigrant flow, but also on the
national origin composition of immigrants.3
Prior to the Great Migration, the size of the immigrant flow had reached a peak of 2.8
million persons in the decade between 1871 and 1880, Due to a confluence of economic, social,
2 Higham (1963) and Jones (1960)provide fascinating accounts of the social and political conscquences
of this population flow
Becausc the analysis presented below uses the 1910 decennial Census to characterize the skills of turn-
or-the-century immigrants. it is important to stress that the Great Migration did not stop in 1910. An
addilional 5.7 million persons migrated between 1911 and 1920, and 2.3 million persons migrated
between 1921 and 1924. when restrictive new immigration policies went into effect.TABLE 1.
SIZE AND NATIONAL ORIGIN COMPOSITION OF IMMIGRAtION, 1871-1910
Number of Immigrants (in l000s)
Country
of Origin: 1871-1880 1881-1890 1891-1900 1901-1910
Austria-Hungary 73.0 313.7 592.7 2145.3
Belgium 7.2 20.2 18.2 41.6
Canada 383.6 393.3 3.3 179.2
China 123.2 61.7 14.6 20.6
France 72.2 50.5 30.8 73.4
Germany 718.2 1453.0 505.2 341.5
Greece .2 2.3 16.0 167.5
Ireland 436.9 655.5 388.4 339.1
Italy 55.8 307.3 651.9 2045.9
Japan .1 2.3 25.9 129.6
Mexico 5.2 1.9 1.0 49.6
Netherlands 16.5 53.7 26.8 48.3
Norway 95.3 176.6 95.0 190.5
Sweden 115.9 391.8 226.3 249.5
Poland 13.0 51.8 96.7 -.
Portugal 14.1 17.0 27.5 69.1
Romania .0 6.3 12.8 53.0
Soviet Union 39.3 213.3 505.3 1597.3
Turkey .4 3.8 30.4 157.4
United Kingdom 548.0 807.5 271.5 526.0
All 2812.2 5246.6 3687.6 8795.4
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1991:46-40). For the
years l899-l9l0 data for Poland was included in Austria-Hungary, Germany,
and the Soviet Union.3
and political factors in some source countries and in the United States, the number of immigrants
increased rapidly over the next three decades. By the early 1900s, 8.8 million persons migrated
during a single decade. In fact, immigration accounted for over half of the change in the
population and labor force of the United States between 1901 and 1910.
Equally important, the Great Migration originated mostly in countries that had not been
important sources of immigrants prior to that point. For instance, during the 1870s and 1880s,
three northwestern European countries—Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom--accounted
for about 60 percent of immigrants, and Canada accounted for an additional 15 percent. By
1900-1910, nearly a quarter of the immigrants originated in Austria-Hungary (which at the time
included large parts of present-day Poland), an additional quarter originated in Italy, and about 20
percent originated in the territories of what would eventually become the Soviet Union. The
number of immigrants from the traditional source countries of Germany, Britain, and Ireland
declined not only relatively but absolutely. Although 1.5 million Germans immigrated during the
1880s, only 342 thousand Germans were part of the much larger 1900-1910 wave. Similarly,
even though 808 thousand British citizens immigrated in the 1 880s, Britain sent only 526
thousand persons between 1900 and 1910.
I use the 1/250 1910 Public Use Sample of the U.S. Census to document the differences
among the ethnic groups that made up the Great Migration (see Strong et al, 1989, for a detailed
The historic shifts in the number and national origin composition of immigrants in the 1830-1910
period were accompanied by substantial changes in the skill endowments of the immigrant flow
(Douglas. 1919). The perceived or actual economic and social impact of these changes became a central
issue in the debate over immigration policy which culminated in the enactment of the national-origins
quota system during the 1920s. An interesting summary of the findings in the 41 -volume report of the
Dillingham Commission is given by Jenks and Lauck (1917).4
description of the data). I restrict the analysis to working men aged 25-64 in 19l0. The native
sample is restricted to white men born in the United States, while the immigrant sample contains
all foreign-born men. Table 2 documents some of the differences between immigrants and natives
revealed by the 1910 Census.
It is evident that the two groups were very different; they had different skills, lived in
different areas, and performed different jobs. Although 37 percent of white native men worked in
agricultural jobs, only 17 percent of immigrants (and merely 11 percent of those in the 1900-1910
wave) worked in agriculture. Immigrants were instead employed in manufacturing jobs: nearly
half worked in the manufacturing sector, as opposed to only a quarter of the native workforce.
Correspondingly, at a time when only 28 percent of natives resided in the 230 largest cities (with
population over 25.000), over half of the immigrants resided in those cities. The "new
immigration," therefore, was essentially an urban phenomenon at a time when the native
population was overwhelmingly agricultural and resided outside urban areas.
Immigrants were also less skilled than natives. One quarter of the immigrants present in
the United States in 1910 (and over a third of those in the 1900-1910 wave) were laborers, while
only II percent of white natives employed outside agriculture were laborers. In addition, 96
percent of natives were literate (i.e.. knew how to read and wilte y language), but only 87
percent of immigrants, and 77 percent of the immigrants in the 1900-1910 wave, were literate.
The analysis below uses avenge earnings in the worker's occupation to measure the worker's skills.
The exclusion of women allows me to ignore the difficult issues introduced by the fact that women who
are out of the labor force do not report an occupation. I also focus on workers aged 25 to 64 so that the
observed occupational earnings are not contaminated by the occupational 'shopping" that takes place
among younger workers, orthe occupational shifts that occur as men approach the end of their
careers.TABLE 2




Variable: All AEriculture £11 Agriculture JJ. Agriculture
Age 39.8 39.0 40.1 39.4 33.5 33.3
X Literate 95.8 98.2 86.9 86.6 77.1 77.4
log (Wage) 6.409 6.535 6.321 6.378 6.212 6.264
2 Residing:
in Large Cities 28.1 43.8 53.7 63.4 54.0 59.8
in Northeast 25.7 33.7 47.2 53.7 52.6 56.6
in North-central 35.2 34.3 34.3 30.7 28.4 28.4
In South 29.6 21.7 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.1
2 Employed in:
Agriculture 36.9 16.7 10.6
Mining 2.2 6.6 10.0
Manufacturing 26.4 44.3 50.8
Transportation 8.5 10.2 12.7
Trade 12.3 10.7 7.1
Public Adm. 2.0 1.7 .8
Professions 4.5 2.2 1.6
Domestic Sen. 3,5 6.0 5.4
Clerical 3,7 1.7 .9
2 Employed as
Laborers 14.1 10.6 24.0 24.0 37.4 36.2
2of Immigrants
Arriving in:
1900-1910 .. - ... 37.7 40.4 .. -
1890-1899 .-. . . - 21.5 21.8 -.- --
1880-1889 -..-- 26.1 25.1
1870-1879 --.-- 8.9 7.8 Priorto 1870 ... --' 5.8 4.8
Sample Size 54,324 34,303 20,14316,783 7,592 6,784
Sample Size
for Wage Data 39,803 34,126 18,24116,741 7,510 6,7755
To obtain a summary measure of immigrant and native skills,! constructed a wage series
based on the detailed occupational categories available in the 1910 Census and the 1900
occupational wage structure calculated by Preston and flames (1991). For the most part, the
Preston-Haines occupational wage data is based on the 1901 cost-of-living survey conducted by
the U.S. Commissioner of Labor.
The occupational codes reported in the 1910 Census were essentially a combination of
industry/occupational breakdowns (for a total of 420 categories). For example, laborers
employed in chemical industries are differentiated from laborers employed in lumber and furniture
industries, who are in turn differentiated from laborers employed by steam railroads. To impute
an average wage to each industry/occupation category in the 1910 Census, I first matched the
1910 Census occupation codes to those reported by the 1900 Census. 1 then used the average
annual earnings calculated by Preston and Haines for each of the 1900 Census occupation codes
to assign each worker in the 1910 Census a mean occupational wage.6
This earnings imputation introduces a number of problems. First, the occupational wage
structure, as described by the 1901 cost-of-living survey underlying the Preston-Haines data,
could have changed substantially by 1910. Unfortunately, little can be done about this problem
since the next survey by the Commissioner of Labor did not occur until 1918, when additional
(and perhaps even larger) changes in the occupational wage structure may have taken place.
Second, the wage measure given by a worker's "occupational earnings" obviously ignores the
sizable intra-occupation skill differentials that exist in the population. Finally, because the income
of many agricultural workers, particularly those who owned their own farms, depended on such
61 stis able to successfully match the occupations o(trken in the 1910 census to the 1900 codes for 99
percent or the workers in my sample.6
unobservable factors as farm and harvest size, Preston and Haines did not impute an income to the
occupation of "farmers", who make up a relatively large fraction of persons employed in the
agricultural industry. This problem is particularly acute for native workers, because nearly 40
percent of them worked in agriculture (and 60 percent of these natives were classified as farmers).
The large number of observations with missing wage data is evident in Table 2, which
shows that only 39,803 white native men (out of a sample of 54,324 workers) were assigned an
occupational wage. Because few immigrants are employed in agriculture, however, there are
fewer missing observations in the calculation of average earnings in the immigrant population; out
of a sample of 20,143 working immigrants, 18,241 were assigned an occupational wage. The
missing data problem, in fact, is not significant for any of the national origin groups making up the
immigrant population.
Table 2 reports that among workers employed outside agriculture, immigrants earned
about 25 percent less than natives.7 The wage disadvantage increased to 25 percent for
immigrants who arrived between 1900 and 1910. The differences between immigrants and
natives, however, are dwarfed by the dispersion that existed among national origin groups in the
immigrant population. Because even at the peak of the Great Migration relatively few countries
were important source of immigration to the United States, only 32 national origin groups
comprised 99.5 percent of the immigrant population. Table 3 documents the differences that
existed among these groups for the stock of immigrants present in the United States in l9l0.
7Blau (1980) and Eichengreen and Gemery (2986) provide interesting studies of the observed earnings
differential between inimigranis and natives at the turn of the century.
Equally large differences among ethnic groups are found itthe calculations are restricted to the
subsample of immigrants who arrived between 1900 and 2910.TABLE 3
SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF IMMIGRANTS IN 1910 CENSUS•BYNATIONAL ORIGIN
Wage
Country ofPercent Percent Percent Percent Log AdjustedSample Sample Oriain Azric. Manuf. Laborer Literate Lea Wan flzs
Atlantic1st. 20.0 56.0 44.0 44.0 6.141 6.102 25 23
Austria 9.2 54.1 32.4 71.6 6.260 6.254 1719 1638
Belgium 20.8 44.4 26.4 90.1 6.306 6.321 71 61
Bulgaria 0.0 31.0 58.6 71.4 6.154 6.266 28 29
Canada 18.1 45.6 12.8 92.3 6.417 6.416 1590 1419
China 20.4 23.8 28.3 84.8 6.170 6.161 231 236
Cuba 0.0 91.7 4.2 87.5 6.401 6.343 24 24
Denmark 40.0 35.1 15.4 99.1 6.345 6.374 347 260
England 12.1 48.1 10.4 99.0 6.428 6.416 1316 1280
Finland 20.3 38.4 22.8 92.4 6.184 6.267 237 222
France 15.2 31.8 7.9 97.3 6.374 6.348 149 139
Germany 24.7 41.7 14.9 96.1 6.400 6.370 3395 2786
Greece 3.2 34.7 42.3 80.5 6.274 6.317 221 221
Hungary 5.0 61.5 41.7 87.7 6.199 6.210 823814
Ireland 9.1 40.4 24.3 96.9 6.333 6.287 1630 1581
Italy 5.9 42.1 42.3 63.0 6.225 6.218 2216 2232
Japan 56.5 13.0 52.7 80.6 5.838 5.958 315 304
Mexico 38.0 18.6 60.5 45.5 5,975 6.040 255237
Netherlands 37.2 39.5 20.9 97.7 6.275 6.280 171131
Norway 43.3 32.5 18.3 97.8 6.290 6.322 580393
Poland 0.0 59.2 36.7 15.0 6.304 6.210 48 49
Portugal 34.3 45.5 31.3 58.2 6.134 6.155 98 89
Romania 1.2 44.0 9.5 85.7 6.548 6.478 84 83
Russia 6.6 53.3 21.4 79.2 6.407 6.367 2244 2166
Scotland 11.9 49.1 7,3 99.7 6.459 6.655 384364
Spain 27.8 36.1 22.2 83.3 6.196 6.227 36 35
Sweden 30.3 43.3 16.9 98.0 6.338 6.349 1073 853
Switzerland37.8 38.3 21.8 97.3 6.234 6.252 187 153
Turkey 3.8 51.6 42.0 72.7 6.277 6.291 154 155
Wales 9.5 39.7 7.9 96.8 6.426 6.441 126 119
West Indies 7.9 23.7 23.7 94.7 6.280 6.215 38 38
Yugoslavia 8.3 16.7 16.7 91.1 6.218 6.361 12 12
Note: The adjusted log wage is based on a regression estimated in the
sample of immigrants in the 1910 Census. The explanatory variables included
age, age squared, a vector of region dummies, and a dummy indicating if the
immigrant resided in a metropolitan area, as well as ethnic fixed effects.
The adjusted log wages are evaluated at the mean value of the explanatory
variables in the immigrant sample.7
There exist huge skill differences among groups. The fraction of immigrants who knew
how to read and write ny language was 45.5 percent for Mexican immigrants, 710 percent for
Polish immigrants, and 99.0 percent for English immigrants. The implied wage differentials are
equally large: Mexican immigrants earn about 15 percent less than Portuguese immigrants, who
in turn earn about 30 percent less than English immigrants.
The ethnic wage differentials remain even after controlling for differences in the age and
residential location of the various immigrant groups. To construct these adjusted wages,!
estimated a regression of the form:
(1) log wX,.cz1+ c/ +s9,
whereis the wage of person i in national origin groupj; Xis a vector of socioeconomic
characteristics defined to have zero mean; and d is the fixed effect of type-j first-generation
Americans (evaluated at the mean level oftheX's). The standardizing variables include age (and
age squared), a vector of dummies indicating region of residence, and a dummy indicating if the
person lives in a metropolitan area.
Table 3 also reports the adjusted log wages. Immigrants who originated in England earn
about 13 percent more than "similar" immigrants who originated in Ireland, who in turn earn
about 25 percent more than those from Mexico. The wage differentials among the national origin
groups that made up the Great Migration, therefore, are sizable and remain even after controlling
for differences in their age distribution and spatial location.8
Ethnic Skill Differentials in the 1940 and 1980 Censuses
Although Census data do not generally identify the skills of parents (except for the small
subsample of persons who still reside with their parents), well-designed intercensal comparisons
of first- and second-generation workers can be used to analyze the extent of intergenerational
mobility. To determine if the skill differentials that characterized the original national origin
groups persisted among their children, I use the 11100 1940 Public Use Sample to identify the
economic status of the various ethnic groups in the second generation.
I restrict the analysis of the data to second-generation men aged 25-64, who worked in the
civilian sector in the year prior to the Census, and who were not enrolled in school. A person is
classified to be a second-generation American if either parent was born outside the United States.
The ethnic group of the second-generation worker is defined in terms of the father's birthplace
(unless only the mother was foreign-born, in which case it is defined in terms of the mother's
birthplace).9 The analysis is further restricted to second-generation workers who can be
classified into one of the 32 national origin groups thatmade up the bulk of the Great Migration.
These workers comprise 98.3 percent of all second-generation workers in 1940.
The analysis focuses on the educational attainment and log wage of second-generation
workers. I use two alternative measures of the wage: the reported log hourly wage of the worker
in the year prior to the Census (i.e., the ratio of annual earnings in 1939 to annual hours worked),
and an occupational wage created by assigning each worker the mean log wage rate in his three-
9Tlib intercensal linkage between parents and children can be improved in a number otways. For
example, the children of immigrants aged 25-44 in 1910 are likely to be relatively young in 1910. while
the children of immigrants aged 45-64 in 1910 arc likely to be relatively older in 1940. 1 experimented
with a number of alternative age breakdowns, and generally obtained the same quantitative results. I
also conducted calculations which defined a person as second-generation only if both parents were born
ouuside thc United States. The results were not sensitive to the definition of the second generation.9
digit occupation. The use of the occupational wage is designed to maintain comparability with the
wagemeasureavailablein the 1910 Census.
The first five columnsofTable 4 summarize the 1940 data. There are substantial
differencesin schooling and wages among second-generation ethnic groups. For instance,
second-generation workers whose parents originated in England or Austria have 2.5 more years
of schooling than those originating in Portugal, and 5 more years than those originating in
Mexico. Similarly, the occupational wage of second-generation English workers is about 10
percent higher than that of German workers, and about 30 percent higher than that of Portuguese
workers. Finally, to determine if these wage differentials could be explained by individual
differences in age or residential location, I estimated an equation analogous to (I) in the 1940
Census data. As Table 4 shows, there is substantial dispersion in adjusted wage rates across
ethnic groups in 1940, even in terms of the occupational wage.
The link between the skill differentials in the first and second generations is illustrated in
Figures 1 and 2. In particular, Figure 1 shows the link between the educational attainment of
1940 second-generation ethnic groups and the literacy rate of the corresponding first-generation
national origin group in 1910, while Figure 2 illustrates the link between the occupational wage of
second-generation ethnic groups in 1940 and the corresponding immigrant group in 1910. The
data points in Figures I and 2 are drawn from measures of literacy, education, and wages that are
adjusted for differences in age, region, and metropolitan residence among groups (i.e., a
regression analogous to (I) was estimated for each of the variables in each Census). It is evident
that there is a strong positive relationship between the skills of immigrants and the skills of
corresponding second-generation ethnic groups.TABLE 4
SIA*IART CHARACTERISTICS OF SECOND GENERATION III 1940 AND TIIIRD GENERATION" IN 1960
1940 Census 1980 Census
Reported Occtcati onat Reported Occtcat lonat
Cotritry of Log LogAdjusted Sa'ipta Log Log Adjusted Saaple
Qr,is.b Education Loq Wage SizeEducation I.og WageSize
Atlantic 1st. 8.3-0.395-0.579-0.564 12 13.1 1.867 1.9761.989 17
AustrIa 10.1 -0.328-0.414-0.434 376 14.5 2.282 2.1412.140 1Q94
Belgiu 9.2-0.453-0.523-0.51631 13.22.152 2.0732.076 382
Bulgaria 13.0-1.204-0.087-0.119 2 13.22.097 2.0852.080 56
Canada 9.6-0.492-0.467—0.444926 12.72.060 2.0462.0401607
China 6.0 1101 -0.912-0.935 21 14.92.153 2.1112.099 424
Cite 9.7-0.722-0442-0.516II 13.2 1.937 2.0502.041 84
Denaark 9.8-0.542-0.528-0.464169 13.82.163 2.0902.0931618
England 10.2-0.287-0.400O.409 860 13.02.076 2.0662.068 64405
FInland 9.2-0.522 -0.559-0.46099 13.5 2.134 2.0742.063 782
France 9.9-0.377-0.395-0.394142 12.62.047 2.0482.046 12139
Germany 9.2-0.410 -0.493-0.489 2590 13.1 2.099 2.0622.065 60877
Greece 99-0.657-0.496-0.508 29 14.02.177 2.0992.0921068
Hisigary 10.1 -0.309 -0.452-0.489154 13.4 2.167 2.0792.0762090
Ireland 9.8-0.315 -0.431-0.458 1265 13.02.084 2.0602.059 33796
ItaLy 9.1 -0.506 -0.503-0.521975 13.0 2.140 2.0652.059 16520
japan 11.5 -1.004 -0.518-0.503 4 13.92.142 2.0632.0571050
Mexico 5.0-1.297-1.067-0.995121 10.71.895 1.9411.9287139
NetherLands9.6-0.563 -0.528-0.479Ill 12.72.050 2.0462.0495817
Norway 100-0.529-0.561-0.488 360 13.52.0% 2.0612.0684193
Poland &9-0.466 -0.499-0.523 852 13.1 2.145 2.067 2.065 11197
Portugal 7.6-0.606-0.705-0.666 41 12.2 2.046 2.0102.0001043
Romania 11.6-0.496 -0.363•0.391 43 14.62.266 2.1282.121 356
Russia 11.2-0.347-0.354-0.378 669 15.4 2.313 2163 2.1543519
Scotland 10.2-0.305-0.439 0.444269 13.92.142 2.1032.102 11223
Spain 9.2-0.424 -0.352-0.388 22 11.9L888 2.0061.993 87
Sweden 10.1-0.389-0.486-0.451652 13.72.148 2.0852.0884885
SwitzerLand10.3-0.307-0.436-0.430118 14.0 2.128 2.1002.1051037
Turkey 11.3-0.340-0.456-0.468 10 14.2L166 2.1632.160 33
wales 10.0-0.217 -0.391-0.382 73 14.1 2.137 2.0842.0831873
west Indies9.3-0.631 -0.611-0.754 4 12.2 1.837 2.0021.992 36
YugosLavia 8.9-0.316-0.501-0.49567 13.4 2.243 2.0882.0851061
Note: The adjusted log wages are based on regressions estimated separately in the castle of
second-generation workers in 1940 and third-generation workers in 1980. The explanatory variables
included age age squared, a vector of region duinies, and a dtnny Indicating if the innigrant resided
in a metropolitan area, as welt as ethnic fixed effects. The 1940 adjusted tog ages are evaluated at
the mean value of the explanatory variables in the second-generation sanple, while the 1980 adjusted log
wages are evaLuated at the mean value of the explanatory variables in the third-generation sasple.FigurE 1. Link in Educational Attainment and Literacy Rates
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To determine the intensity of this link, I estimated regressions of the form:
(2)
wherey measures the skills of person/in ethnic group) in the second generation; X, isa vector
of standardizing characteristics defined to have mean zero; andis the measure of average skills
for type-j immigrants (obtained from the estimation of equation (I) in the 1910 first-generation
sample). As before, the standardizing vectorX includes age (and age squared), a vector of
region dummies, and a dummy variable indicating if the individual lived in a metropolitan
residence. The coefficient y is the intergenerational transmission coefficient, or a rough measure
of the "intergenerational correlation."
It is useful to provide an alternative interpretation of the regression model in (2). An
ethnic fixed effect can be estimated among second-generation workers in the 1940 Censususing
the specification:
(3)
Because the variables in the vector Xare defined to have meanzero, the fixed effectgives the
adjusted skills of the ethnic group. The extent to which the avenge skills of second-generation
type-j workers are related to the average skills of their parents is summarized by:
(4)11
Substituting (4) into (3) yields the model in (2). Note that the disturbance in (2)equals tp17 + v,, so
that it contains a group-specific error term. Therefore, the mode! is estimatedusing a random-
effects estimator)0
Table 5 reports the estimated transmission coefficients for a number of alternative
specifications of equation (2); the corresponding regression lines linking the ethnic fixed effects in
the two generations are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The first row relates the 1940 educational
attainment of the ethnic group to the literacy rate of the immigrantgroup in 1910. It is evident
that the second-generation offspring of skilled immigrantgroups had more schooling. In
particular, a 20 percentage point difference in literacy rates among two immigrantgroups in 1910
translated to a difference of about one year of schooling for their children. Thesummary statistics
in Table 3 indicate that differences in literacy rats of 20 percent or moreamong the groups were
not uncommon, so that the linkage between the two generations generates substantial differences
in educational attainment among second-generation workers.
The second row of Table 5 relates the occupational wage of the ethnicgroup in 1940 to
the wage of the immigrant group in 1910. The regression also indicates avery strong link
between the wages of immigrants and their ethnic children. The intergenerational transmission
coefficient is in the order of.6."
tO It is important to note that the random effects estimatorroughly weighs each observation by some
estimate of sampling variance. As a result, national origin groups that have few obsen'ations (as some
groups in Table .1 do) contribute relatively little to the estimation of the intergenerational correlation.
The results summarized in Table S do not address the question of whether there is more mobility
bettveen immigrants and their children than between any other to generations. Boijas (1993) uses the
I 940 and 197(1 Censuses to analyze the economic improvement.experieneed by the children of
immigrants present in the United States in 1940. The data suggest that the mobility between the first
and sccomid generations exceeds that experienced by the children of second-generation workers.TABLE S




1940Dependent Literacy Log for1940
Variable: Education
I. Education 5.1176* No .100
(.9597)
2. Occupational .6018* No .081
Log Wage (.1374)
* 3.Occupational --- .2260 Yes .186
Log Wage (.0872)
4. Reported .6724* No .110
Log Wage (.1942)
* 5.Reported --- .2689 Yes .148
Log Wage (.1516)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The explanatory
variables also include age, age squared, a vector of region dummies, and a
dummy indicating if the worker resided in a metropolitan area. The
regressions are estimated using a random-effects estimator. The sample size
of second-generation workers in 1940 is 11,079.
*
Statisticallysignificant at the 5 percent level in a one-tailed test.12
It is ofinterest to determine if the link between the wages of second-generation ethnic
groups and the skills of immigrants remains after controlling for the education level of second-
generation workers. To address this issue, I reestimated (2) after expanding the vector Xto
include educational attainment. The estimated transmission coefficients are reported in the third
row of the table. Controlling for education among second-generation workers weakens the link
between the first and second generations, but the intergenerational transmission coefficient of.2 is
still numerically and statistically significant.
The last two rows of the table replicate the analysis by using the second-generation
worker's reported log wage in 1939 (as opposed to the occupational wage) as the dependent
variable. The introduction of intra-occupation skill differentials slightly increases the
intergenerational transmission coefficients."
To determine the extent to which these ethnic differences are transmitted to still another
generation, the grandchildren of the Great Migration immigrants,! initially use the 1980 Census.
These data, however, do not provide information on the birthplace of grandparents (and since
1980 the Census does not even provide information on the birthplace of parents). Thus the
analysis based on the 1980 Census data contains a substantial amount of measurement error in the
measures of third-generation skills. I will show below, however, that the results obtained from
the Census data do not change when the study is replicated on a (smaller) data set that provides
direct information on the birthplace of grandparents.
In the 1980 Census, individuals were asked to self-report their ancestral group. I use the
person's first reported ancestry to classi& workers into one of the 32 ethnic groups used in the
12The R statistics reported in Table S refer to the explanatoty powvr of the micro-level model in
equation (2). The R of the second-stage regression in equation (4)is generally in the range of.3 to .4.13
analysis.'3 This matching was possible for nearly 80 percent of non-black natives. Persons who
could not be classified into one of the 32 groups were omitted from the analysis. Most of the
persons who were omitted either did not report an ancestry (45 percent of the excluded
observations), or reported 'American" (26 percent).'4
I again restrict the study to native-born working men aged 25-64, who were employed in
the civilian sector in the year prior to the Census, and who were not enrolled in school. An
occupational wage is calculated by assigning each worker the 1980 mean log wage in his three-
digit occupation, and the reported wage is defined as the ratio of annual earnings to annual hours
worked. The last live columns of Table 4 summarize the ethnic skill differentials found in 1980.
Although the di1Ferential have narrowed by the "third generation", there still remain significant
differences, even among groups of European origin. The educational attainment of persons of
Dutch or French ancestry is approximately 12.5 years, while the educational attainment of
Austrians or Russians is about IS years. Similarly, the wage of Irish workers is about 20percent
less than that of Austrian or Russian workers.
Figures 3 and 4 contrast the educational attainment and occupational wage of the ethnic
groups in the 1980 Census with the skills of the immigrant groups in the 1910 Census. There is a
correlation between the skills of the original immigrantgroups and the skills of ethnic groups two
generations apart. To determine the intensity of this link,! estimated regressions of the form:
t3The l9X0 Census allows persons to reportIssodifferent ancestries (e.g.. Gennan-Irish). My analysis
is based on the classification obtained from the first reported ancestry. I experimenued s'-ith alternative
classiflcatjoiis that used the second reported ancestry. These experimenis. however, did not atier the
results because fewer than 40 percent otihe observations in my sample reported an additional ancestry.
14 The 1930 Census extract obviously doesnot provide a random sample of the third-generation.
Because the subsample used in the analysis is restricted to persons ssitli the strongest ethnic identit)-. the
probability thai the 1930 data is mainly composed of second- and third-generation Americans is
increased,Figure 3. Link in Educational Attainment and Literacy Rates
Between First and Third Generations 00
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(5)
wherey, measures the skills of"third-generation" workers in the 1980 Census. If the
intergenerational transmission parameter in equation (2) is constant across generations, the
parameter 9 should be equal to 2• Table 6 presents the key results obtained from alternative
specifications of equation (5).
The first row reports a strong correlation between the educational attainment of ethnic
groups in 1980 and the literacy rates of the immigrant groups during the Great Migration. A 20
percentage point differential among immigrants in 1910 leads to a .5 yen difference in educational
attainment among their "grandchildren". Note that this statistic is half the size of the impact of
the 1910 literacy rate on the educational attainment of second-generation workers in 1940.
Because the 1940 and 1980 Censuses provide data on years of schooling while the 1910 Census
reports the literacy rate of the immigrant grandparents, the regression coefficients in the first row
of Tables 5 and 6 cannot be interpreted as an intergenerational correlation in educational
attainment. If the relationship between literacy and years of schooling in the immigrant generation
is linear, however, the jj of the coefficients in Tables 5 and 6 estimates the intergenerational
correlation between the second and third generations.15 The implied correlation is .47.
IS Letbe the (unobserved) educational attainment of groupj in the immigrant generation. The
observed data oil literacy rates is given by the variable Suppose that the relationship between these
two skill measures can be written as:
v11=eSl)1 +1i.
The equatiotis that can be estimated are:
•1 =•';°i + ':t +e4p,TABLE 6




1980Dependent Literacy Log for1980
Variable: Education
1. Education 2.4202* Mo .086
(.7926)
2. Occupational .2006* No .028
Log Wage (.0469)
3. Occupational
.-- .0686* Yes .183
Log Wage (.0156)
*
4.Reported --- .2684 No .080
Log Wage (.0867)
5. Reported --- .0673 Yes .135
Log Wage (.0442)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The explanatory
variables also include age, age squared, a vector of region dummies, and a
dummy indicating if the worker resided in a metropolitan area. The
regressions are estimated using a randon-effects estimator. The sample size
of third-generation workers in 1980 is 251,658.
*
Statisticallysignificant at the 5 percent level in a one-tailed test.'5
Theremaining rows of Table 6 also indicate that the relative wage of an immigrant group
in 1910 has a strong effect on the relative wage of the corresponding third-generation ethnic
group in 1980. In particular, the estimated transmission coefficient is approximately .2 to ,3
(depending on whether the dependent variable is the 1980 occupational wage or the reported
wage). The correlation decreases to about .07 when the educational attainment of the third
generation is held constant.
Table 6 thus reveals that the ethnic skill differentials introduced by the Great Migration
have persisted until at least 1980. The wage regressions, however, suggest that the parameter U is
less than Table 5 estimates 3 to be between .6 to .7, while Table 6 estimates 8 to be between
.2 and .3. The results thus raise the possibility that the intergenerational transmission coefficient is
not constant across generations, but gets weaker the longer the ethnic group resides in the United
States. The estimated parameters, however, have large standard errors, and I cannot reject the
hypothesis that f32 = 8. The t-statistic associated with this test equals .72, well below
conventional significance levels (where the t-statistic was calculating using the "delta method")..
As a result, the smaller point estimate of the intergenerational correlations estimated from 1980
wage data may be simply due to the misdefinition of the sample of"third-generation' workers.
Ethnic Capital and Convergence
The ratio orthe coefficients on the 1910literacyrate identifies 8/n.If8 = 2, the ratio is then equal to
p. if the intergenerational correlation changes across generations so that t is the correlation between the
second and third generations then e = t. and the ratio of coefficients identifies the correlation between
the second and third generations ott.16
The analysis of decennial Census data from 1910 to 1980 reveals that the ethnic skill
differentials created by the Great Migration did not converge within three generations, and that it
may take at least one more generation for these differences to disappear from the American
economy. I now show that the key reason for the slow convergence is the role played by ethnicity
itself in the intergenerational transmission of skills.
In recent work (Borjas, 1992), I have argued that ethnicity acts as an externality in the
human capital accumulation process. In particular, the skills of the next generation depend not
only on parental inputs, but also on the avenge quality of the ethnic environment in which parents
make their investments, or "ethnic capital"." Persons who grow up in advantageous ethnic
environments will, on average, be exposed to social, cultural, and economic factors that increase
their productivity when they grow up. while persons who grow up in a disadvantaged ethnic
milieu are likely to be adversely affected by this exposure. It is easy to show that if this ethnic
spillover is sufficiently strong, skill differentials observed among immigrant groups can persist for
many generations. The simplest version of the ethnic capital model suggests that the
intergenerational transmission process can be described by:
(6) y9(,)=f3y3(; — — l)+e(t),
whereyyQ) gives the skill level of person i in ethnic groupj in generation t, and — I) gives the
average skill level of the ethnic group in generation t - 1.
16T1)c ethnic cnpital model is closely related Io the grossing literature that siudics the rate of
convergence in per capita income (or output) across countries. Insightful discussions of these Thew"
grontlt models are given by Lucas (1983) and Itomer (1986).17
The hypothesis that ethnicity has spillover effects on human capital accumulation has been
widely used in the sociology literature. For instance, Coleman (1988) stresses that the culture in
which the individual is raised (which he calls "social capital") is a form of human capital common
to all members of that group. He argues that social capital alters the opportunity set of workers
and has significant effects on behavior, human capital formation, and labor market outcomes.
Similarly, in his influential study of the underclass, Wilson (1986) argues that the presence of
mainstream role models in poor neighborhoods serves an important social and economic ftinction.
It is easy to show the link between the ethnic capital model in (6) and the intergenerational
transmission coefficients estimated using the aggregate Census data in the previous section.
Aggregating equation (6) within ethnic groups leads to:
(7)
The regressions estimated in aggregate Census data, therefore, estimate 3, + j3. This sum yields
precisely the intergenerational transmission coefficient relevant for determining the rate at which
the mean skills of ethnic groups converge across generations, or "mean-convergence"."
To document the importance of ethnic capital in delaying the disappearance of the ethnic
differentials introduced by the Great Migration, I use data drawn from the General Social
Surveys, a series of annual cross-sections that have been collected since the mid-l970s (Davis and
Smith, 1989). The GSS is well-suited for the analysis because it reports if the parents and
t7The intcrgcnerationnl transmission coefficients estimated in aggregate Census data arc known in the
sociological literature as "ecological" correlations. For a discussion of alternative concepts of
convcrgcncc. see Bano and Sala-i-Manin (1992).18
grandparents were born outside the United States, as well as provides information on ethnicity
and parental education and occupation. The empirical analysis pools persons aged 18-64 from the
1977-1989 cross-sections and focuses on the study of intergenerational mobility in educational
attainment and earnings. The earnings of both the father and of the GSS respondent are obtained
by matching the 1970 Census occupation codes reported in the GSS to mean earnings in the
occupation as reported by the 1970 Census.
The ethnicity question in the GSS resembles the ancestry question in the 1980 Census.
Although most persons in the sample gave only one ancestral background, some gave multiple
responses. I then use the main ethnic background (as identified by the respondent) to classi& the
GSS respondents into the 32 ethnic groups that made up the bulk of the Great Migration.
Persons who have missing data on the ethnicity question, who cannot be classified into one of the
32 groups, or who have missing data on the other variables used in the analysis are omitted from
the study. Finally, the analysis is restricted to the GSS respondents who had at least one foreign-
born grandparent, so that the OSS results focus specifically on third-generation Axnericans.'
Equation (7) relates the skills of generation t (the GSS respondents) to those of their
parents. The equation relating the skills of the parents to those ofthe immigrant grandparents is:
(8) — 0=8 £Q — 2)+8, 9(1 — 2)+c4Q —1),
I conducted some calculations to dctermine if the results changed appreciably when the sample of
third-generation Americans contained only persons who had either two or four grandparents born
outside the United States. Although the estimates of the model had larger standard errors, the
qualitative nature of the results did not change.19
where I allow for the intergenerational transmission coefficients to differ across generations.
Aggregating (8) within ethnic groups and substituting in (6) yields:
(9) y9(!—I)=J31y(s— 1)+13, (81+8,)71Q—2)+v4(t),
which relates the skills of third-generation Americans to the skills of their parents and to the mean
skills of the ethnic group in the grandparent's generation (obtained from the 1910 Census). Note
that the rate of mean-convergence between the first and second generations is given by +
while the rate of mean-convergence between the second and the third is given bye1 + 82. The
estimation of equations (6) and (9) identi& three parameters: P1.and the sum 8 + 82.
Although it is not possible to test if the impact of parental or ethnic capital is constant across
generations (i.e., l3 = 132 and 8 = 82), it is possible to test if the measure of mean convergence is
constant across generations (P + = e, + 02).
Table 7 reports the ethnic differentials in educational attainment and earnings observed
both among GSS respondents and among their fathers. It is evident that ethnic differences exist
not only among ethnic groups in the second-generation (i.e., the parents oIGSS respondents), but
also among ethnic groups in the third. For instance, the educational attainment of persons whose
grandparents originated in Austria and England is about 3 years higher than that of persons of
Mexican background, but 1 year lower than that of persons of Japanese or Russian ancestry.
The key parameters estimated in the OSS data are reported in Table 8. 1 used a random
effects estimator to allow for a group-specific component in the error term. Consider initially the
results from the log wage regressions. The first row of the panel presents the ethnic capital modelTABLE 7
SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF THIRDGENERATIONIN GSS •BYETHNIC GROUP
Countryof Father's LogFather's Sample
Orizin: Education Education Lop Wne
Austria 13.8 11.4 1.468 1.438 24
Belgium 13.2 10.3 1.240 1.434 10
Canada 12.7 11.2 1.349 1.394 100
China 18.0 12.0 1.697 1.574 1
Denmark 14.1 10.3 1.372 1.236 40
England 13.8 11.8 1.428 1.410 253
Finland 12.9 11.1 1.309 1.283 30
France 13.4 10.6 1.368 1.364 58
Germany 13.2 10.4 1.396 1.287 605
Greece 14.0 13.0 1.379 1.590 10
Hungary 14.4 10.9 1.422 1.480 27
Ireland 13.5 11.6 1.414 1.373 349
Italy 13.4 11.4 1.382 1.382 332
Japan 15.3 11.1 1.425 1.439 9
Mexico 11.0 7.1 1.272 1.089 89
Netherlands 13.0 9.0 1.370 1.145 52
Norway 13.5 11.2 1.367 1.254 109
Poland 13.6 10.7 1.389 1.358 184
Portugal 13.0 10.7 1.195 1.348 9
Romania 14.7 13.0 1.321 1.414 7
Scotland 14.1 12.3 1.419 1.358 71
Spain 12.2 9.9 1.313 1.247 18
Sweden 13.6 11.9 1.399 1.319 105
Switzerland 13.0 12.5 1.360 1.230 19
USSR 15.1 13.0 1.536 1.509 67
Yugoslavia 13.3 9.9 1.386 1.360 29TABLE 8
INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION IN CSS
I. EducationalAttainment Retressions
Mean EducationLiteracy
Parental in Parent'sRate of 1910
2 RetressionEducationGeneration flmoierants




3. .2589* 1.5195 .201
(.0147) (1.3678)
II. LoaWaee Reeressions
Mean Log Wage Mean LogWage
Parental in Parent's of 1910
ReRression Lo Wa2e Generation Immi2rants




3. .1667* .1202 .095
(.0197) (.0997)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The regressions are
estimated using &randomeffects estimator. All regressions control for
age, gender, region, metropolitan residence, and a vector of dummy variables
indicating the year in which the GSS cross-section was drawn. The sample
size is 2,197 for the education regressions and 1,970 for the log wage
regressions.
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level in a one-tailed test.20
as given by equation (6). The GSS data indicate that both the father's wages and the mean wages
of the ethnic group in the father's generation are important determinants of the earnings of GSS
respondents. The sum of the two coefficients, which estimates the rate of mean-convergence
between the second and third generations, is approximately .46.
The link between the earnings of the GSS grandchildren and the earnings of the immigrant
grandparents is explored in the remaining rows. In particular, the second row reports the
coefficient measuring the extent of mean-convergence between the grandparents and the children
to be .22. Because this statistic is approximately the square of.46, the results suggest that the
intergenerational transmission coefficient is relatively the same across any two generations.
Finally,the thirdtow presents the estimated coefficients of equation (9), and shows that
the average earnings of the 1910 immigrant groups has an independent effect on the skills of the
grandchildren (although this effect is not very significant). If the modet in (9) is correct, the
parameter measuring mean-convergence between the 1910 immigrants and their children is
approximately .41 (or the ratio. 12021.2945), almost the same as the rate of mean-convergence
between the second and third generations. The GSS data, therefore, indicate that the coefficient
measuring mean convergence in the log wages of ethnic groups is in the order of.4 to .5, and is
relatively constant across generations.
The top panel of Table S reveals an equally long-lasting impact of the 1910 literacy rate on
the educational attainment of the OSS grandchildren. Row I estimates the rate of mean
convergence in educational attainment to be .53. Rows 2 and 3 reveal that a 20 percentage point
increase in the literacy rate of the 19l0 immigrant group increases the educational attainment of21
the GSS respondent by .5 years if parental education is not held constant and by .3 years when
parental education is included in the regression.
It i.s worth noting that there is a strong similarity in the estimated rates of mean-
convergence in the Census and the GSS. In particular, the Census data suggest that a 10 percent
increase in the wage of the immigrant group in 1910 increaseathe earnings of 1980 native ethnics
(who proxy for their grandchildren) by 2.0 percent. The GSS results, which specifically focus on
the sample of third-generation Americans, estimates the statistic to be 2.2 percent.
The estimated intergenerational correlation of.4 to .5 in the rneii skills of ethnic groups
implies that it might take four generations, or roughly 100 years, for the skill differences
introduced by the Great Migration to disappear. This is a much slower rate of convergence than
the within-group regression towards the mean (the within-group intergenerational correlation is in
the order of.25).Itis also a much slower rate of convergence than is experienced by members of
different ethnic groups with similarly-skilled fathers (that correlation is also about .25).Itis the
combination of the influence of parental skills and the ethnic spillover which tends to delay the
convergence of ethnic skill differentials for century.
Black Intergenerational Mobility
Because the paper focuses on the convergence of the skill differentials introduced by the
Great Migration. I omitted the sample of American-born blacks from the study. It is often
claimed that blacks differed from the persons who arrived during the Great Migration because the
immigrants were able to improve their economic situation over time, but black economic status
did not change appreciably across generations. I now evaluate the validity of this hypothesis by22
using the regression models estimated earlier to determine if the intergenerational mobility
experienced by blacks differed from that experienced by the mainly white immigrant groups.
The skills of black workers in 1910 were substantially below those of white natives, and
were also lower than the skills of most national origin groups. The literacy rate of blacks was
68.4 percent, and the log occupational wage was 6.006 (after standardizing for age and region of
residence). By comparing these statistics with the corresponding numbers for white natives or for
immigrant groups in Tables 2 and 3, it is evident that blacks started out the century at a
substantial disadvantage. The literacy rate of blacks, for example, was nearly 30 percentage
points below that of white natives and 15 percentage points below that of immigrants. Similarly,
the wage of blacks was about 30 percent below that of immigrants as a group, and was lower than
the wage of all but one of the immigrant groups (the exception being the Japanese).
Given these initial values, Table 9 uses the regression equations estimated in Census data
to predict black intergenerational mobility. To understand the nature of the exercise, it is
instructive to work through one of the rows in Table 9 in detail. Consider the first row, which
predicts black educational attainment in 1940 as a function of the 1910 black literacy rate. If
black intergenerational progress between 1910 and 1940 had been the same as that ofthe white
ethnic groups in the Great Migration (as summarized by the regression in TableS, row 1), the
1910 black literacy rate of 68.4 percent implies an educational attainment of8.6 years in 1940. In
fact, blacks only had 6.3 years of schooling in 1940. Black intergenerational mobility, therefore,
was substantially slower than that of immigrants with the same initial conditions in 1910.
A similar retardation of black economic progress is shown in row 3, which predicts the
1940 black wage as a function of the 1910 black wage (based on the regression in Table 5, rowTABLE 9
OUT-0F-SANPLEPREDICTION FORBLACKINTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
BlackMean Actual Prediction Minus
Prediction of: in Base Period PredictionValue Actual Value
1. 1940 Black Education as .684 8.568 6.305 2.263*
Function of 1910 (.233)
Black Literacy Rate
2. 1980 Black Education as .684 12.502 11.383 1.119*
Function of 1910 (.213)
Black Literacy Rate
3. 1940 Black Log Wage as 6.006 -.668 -.932 .264*
Function of 1910 (.046)
Black Log Wage
4. 1980 Black Log Wage as 6.006 1.996 1.966 .030*
Function of 1910 (.016)
Black Log Wage
5. 1980 Black Education as 6.305 11.718 11.383 .335
Function of 1940 (.265)
Black Education
6. 1980 Black Log Wage as -.932 1.963 1.966 -.003
Function of 1940 (.016)
Black Log Wage
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 5percentlevel in a one-tailed test.23
2). If blacks had experienced the same income mobility as the ethnic groups, the initial adjusted
log wage of 6.006 implied a 1940 log wage rate of -.668. The actual black log wage was -.932,
or about 25 percent lower than the prediction.
Rows 2 and 4 of Table 9 use the 1910 initial conditions to predict black educational
attainment and earnings in 1980 (using the regressions reported in Table 6. rows I and 2). These
predictions, although still higher than actual black performance in 1980, are not as far off the
mark as the 1940 predictions. In particular, given the 1910 initial conditions, blacks in 1980
should have had "only" 1.1 more year of schooling and 3 percent higher wage rates.
The very different implications of the 1940 and 1980 predictions suggests that black
intergenerational mobility may have differed radically between the pre- and postwar periods.
Rows S and 6 of Table 9 predict 1980 educational attainment and wages as a function of the 1940
black values (based on unreported regressions linking the 1980 earnings of third-generation ethnic
groups to the 1940 earnings of second-generation Americans). These predictions are remarkably
close to what was actually observed. The 1940 black education level of 6.3 years implies a 1980
education level of 11.7 years. only slightly higher than the 11.4 years reported by the 1980
Census; the 1940 black wage of -.932 implies a 1980 wage of 1.963, almost the same as the
actual black wage in 1980.
It is evident, therefore, that fundamental changes in the process guiding black mobility led
to relatively similar intergenerational progress for blacks and for non-black ethnics in the postwar
period. The shift in the structure that describes black intergenerational mobility may be related to
improving school quality for blacks, to civil rights legislation, or to the migration of blacks from
the rural South to manufacturing jobs in Northern cities (Lieberson, 1973; Card and Krueger,24
1992;Smith andWelch, 1989; Heckman and Payner, 1989). Much further study, however, is
required to determine why blacks began to "look like" non-black ethnics after 1940.
Summary
This paper analyzed the extent to which ethnic skill differentials converge in the long run.
The analysis focused on the 32 national origin groups that made up the bulk of the 1880-1910
Great Migration, and used the 1910, 1940, and 1980 decennial Censuses, and the General Social
Surveys, to trace out the economic experience of these groups throughout the 20th Century.
The empirical analysis yields a number of substantive findings. First, the Great Migration
introduced huge ethnic skill differentials into the economy. Differences of 20 to 30 percentage
points in literacy rates or wage differentials exceeding 30 percent were not uncommon. These
skill differentials became important determinants of the skills and labor market success of the
children and grandchildren of the Great Migration. A 20 percentage point differential in literacy
rates among two immigrant groups in 1910, for instance, implied a I year difference in
educational attainment in 1940, and a .5 year difference in educational attainment in 1980.
Similarly, a 20 percent wage differential between two groups in 1910 implied a 12 percent wage
differential in 1940, and a 5 percent wage differential in 1980. Finally, the analysis documented
that the intergenerational mobility of American-born blacks was roughly similar to that
experienced by the white ethnic groups making up the Great Migration over the entire century,
though much of the black mobility occurred after 1940.
The slow convergence of ethnic skill differentials arises partly because ethnicity has
spillover effects on the human capital accumulation process. In particular, the 'quality" of the25
ethnic environment has an impact on the human capital of children above and beyond parental
inputs. In other words, exposure to advantageous ethnic environments has a positive influence on
the human capital accumulation process, while exposure to disadvantage environments has a
negative influence (above and beyond the parental influence). These spillover effects retard
intergenerational improvement for relatively disadvantaged ethnic groups, and slow down the
deterioration of skills (i.e.. the regression towards the mean) among the more advantaged groups.
In sum, ethnicity matters and it matters for a very long time. In fact, the results indicate
that it may take four generations, or roughly 100 years, for the ethnic differentials introduced by
the Great Migration to work themselves through the American economy. This result has obvious
implications for the ongoing debate over immigration policy. As with the First Great Migration
that arrived at the beginning of the 20th Century. the Second Great Migration that is arriving at
the end of the 20th century is also composed of groups which differ greatly in their skills. Ifthe
intergenerational correlations estimated in this paper are constant over time, the results imply that
current immigration is setting the stage for the ethnic differences in economic outcomes that are
likely to be a dominant feature of labor markets in the United States throughout the next century.26
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